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INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, the emergence of blockchain technology and 
cryptocurrency has completely disrupted traditional capital markets, 
becoming a hot topic among regulators1, legislators2, financial 
professionals3, and even celebrities.4 Straying away from the conventional 
means of fundraising, digital asset transactions enable developers to raise 
capital online to fund a digital project, platform, or software through the 
distribution of tokens. Taking the place of initial public offerings (“IPOs”), 
emerging technology companies have opted out of pitching their ideas to 
venture capitalists and have increasingly looked to initial coin offerings 
(“ICOs”) to finance the development of their networks. In turn, ICOs have 
come under siege by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
because these transactions often involve the distribution of security tokens. 
These tokens entitle their holders to certain rights and may thus qualify as 
“securities.” Once these tokens are distributed, they may be resold on a 
secondary market to investors through a virtual currency exchange or an 
online platform. And since crypto markets are largely unregulated, many 
investors are scammed and defrauded in the process. Now, the SEC 
actively monitors digital asset transactions and has begun its crackdown 
on ICOs.  
 
1 Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-
clayton-2017- 12-11.  
2 See Kia Kokalitcheva, Congress Holds First Hearing on Initial Coin Offerings, AXIOS 
(Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.axios.com/crypto-ico-congress-1521059028-8807c852-
22de-461a-8c9e- 8a8a9f85d452.html. 
3 See Beyond the Hype: Blockchain Technology, ADVISOR PERSPECTIVES (Mar. 28, 2019), 
https://www.advisorperspectives.com/podcasts/2019/03/28/beyond-the-hype-blockchain-
technology.  
4 Ana Alexandre, US SEC Charges Floyd Mayweather Jr and DJ Khaled for Unlawfully 
Promoting ICO, COINTELEGRAPH (Nov. 29, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/us-sec-
charges-floyd-mayweather-jr-and-dj-khaled-for-unlawfully-promoting-ico. 
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To combat the slew of enforcement actions against ICO-conducting 
companies, developers are searching for a new way to comply with 
demanding federal securities laws. Thus, airdrops have entered the scene. 
These “free” token distributions are an imaginative attempt to further 
evade the securities regulations. But “free” does not mean free from 
regulatory compliance. Airdrops may qualify as securities offerings, even 
though the tokens are touted as “free,” bearing strong similarity to “free-
stock” offerings and other instances of “gifted” securities. Furthermore, 
regulators have addressed digital asset trading platforms, broker-dealers, 
and other cryptocurrency transactions to deter issuers from conducting 
offerings without meeting the requirements set in place by the existing 
regulatory framework. Labeling a securities offering as “free” does not 
exclude it from the purview of  the securities laws—even if it makes 
assessing the transaction more difficult.  
Although the “crypto craze” has slowed, billions of dollars are still 
being raised through digital asset transactions, leaving countless investors 
without any protection. Developers continue to craft new names and 
methods of conducting securities offerings to escape compliance. In 
response, regulators have imposed greater regulatory scrutiny, leaving 
little wiggle room for entrepreneurs and new innovations. Balancing the 
governments interests in protecting investors, fostering innovation and 
creating an efficient market remains challenging, and ultimately the 
existing framework might need to be supplemented. 
This note aims to clarify and analyze the role of airdrops and the 
current state of the crypto market surrounding these transactions, with the 
goal of educating the legal community on concepts involving these 
security token offerings. Part I of this Note begins by giving a brief 
background on cryptocurrency and blockchain technology before 
discussing the categorization of coins and tokens. Next, Part I explains 
why developers use ICOs and how they are conducted. Part I concludes 
with information about airdrops, including what they are, why developers 
use them, and how they work.  
Part II will give an overview on the SEC’s developing jurisdiction 
over digital assets. Part II also defines the term “security token”, explains 
the criteria under the Howey test, and describes the registration 
requirements that are pertinent to digital asset transactions. Lastly, Part II 
examines the regulatory landscape surrounding ICOs which has led to the 
emergence of airdrops.  
Part III applies the Howey test to examine airdrops in the context of 
the federal securities laws. Part III then considers whether these token 
distributions need to comply with registration requirements by looking at 
prior SEC cases where companies “gifted” stocks.  This Part will also 
explore how airdrops emulate “free stock” offerings that were halted by 
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the SEC, presenting four seminal cases that are analogous to “free” token 
offerings. Afterward, this Part describes the first cease and desist order that 
appears to address airdrops. Part III also clarifies regulators’ positions 
based on their recent actions as well as past cases and discusses what might 
be in store for airdrops and the volatile crypto market. Part III concludes 
by proposing a potential alternative to a more stringent regulatory regime.  
This Note concludes that airdrops might be “free,” but they are not 
free from regulatory compliance. Regulators will continue to protect 
investors, even at the cost of inhibiting innovation. However, an 
alternative to strict regulation might afford better protection to investors. 
II. UNDERSTANDING AIRDROPS 
A. Brief Background on Cryptocurrency 
To fully understand airdrops, it is important to first understand 
cryptocurrency, tokens and ICOs. A cryptocurrency is a digital currency 
which uses encryption algorithms and cryptographic techniques to 
regulate the generation of units of currency and verify the transfer of funds, 
operating independently from a central bank.5 It functions as a virtual 
medium, but rather than holding on to a tangible piece of paper, 
cryptocurrency holders can exchange these virtual assets without having 
to rely on a financial institution to process each transaction.6 These 
transactions are processed and completed via a peer-to-peer network 
through the use of blockchain technology and code.7    
Blockchain serves as the foundation for cryptocurrencies,8 and most 
notably bitcoin.9  Originating in 2009, blockchain technology was first 
implemented by an anonymous author going by the pseudonym Satoshi 
Nakamoto.10 Blockchain is: 
 
5 Ameer Rosic, What is Cryptocurrency? [Everything You Need To Know!], 




8 See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-PeerElectronic Cash System, BITCOIN (2008), 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
9 BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#general (last visited Feb. 8, 2020) (“Bitcoin is a 
consensus network that enables a new payment system and a completely digital money. It 
is the first decentralized peer-to-peer payment network that is powered by its users with no 
central authority or middlemen. From a user perspective, Bitcoin is pretty much like cash 
for the Internet.”). 
10 Bernard Marr, A Short History of Bitcoin and Crypto Currency Everyone Should Read, 
FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/12/06/a-short-
history-of-bitcoin-and-crypto-currency-everyone-should-read/#12f6a32d3f27. 
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“[a] tamper-evident, shared digital ledger that records 
transactions in a public or private peer-to-peer network. 
Distributed to all member nodes in the network, the ledger 
permanently records, in a sequential chain of 
cryptographic hash-linked blocks, the history of asset 
exchanges that take place between the peers in the 
network. All the confirmed and validated transaction 
blocks are linked and chained from the beginning of the 
chain to the most current block, hence the 
name blockchain. The blockchain thus acts as a single 
source of truth, and members in a blockchain network can 
view only those transactions that are relevant to them.”11 
Blockchain therefore enables secure peer-to-peer transactions to take 
place without the use of a third-party intermediary, such as a bank.12  
B. Categorization of Crypto: Coins vs. Tokens  
Cryptocurrencies that have their own separate, standalone blockchain 
are referred to as coins while the term token can refer to any 
cryptocurrency that is built on top of an existing blockchain.13 Thus, 
tokens require another platform to host them so that they may operate and 
exist.14 While coins are used to store value and pay for services much in 
the same way you would use physical money, tokens instead represent 
digital assets with wider functionality.15  
Tokens can represent almost any asset that is fungible and 
tradeable16—from commodities to voting rights.17 Since tokens only 
require an existing platform, they are much easier to create than coins.18 
Moreover, creating your own token is practically effortless thanks to 
 
11 Sloane Brakeville & Bhargav Perepa, Blockchain Basics, INT’L BUS. MACH. CORP. 
(IBM) (Mar. 18, 2018), https://developer.ibm.com/tutorials/cl-blockchain-basics-intro-
bluemix-trs/. 
12 See Nakamoto, supra note 8. 
13 Delton Rhodes, Crypto Coin vs. Token: Understanding the Difference, COINCENTRAL 
(Aug. 10, 2018), https://coincentral.com/crypto-coin-vs-token-cryptocurrency/. 
14 The Basics: Coin vs. Token. What is the Difference?, CITOWISE (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://blog.citowise.com/the-basics-coin-vs-token-what-is-the-difference-5cd270591538. 
15 Token vs Coin—what’s the difference? CHRONO.TECH (Aug. 13, 2017), 
https://blog.chronobank.io/token-vs-coin-whats-the-difference-5ef7580d1199. 
16 Aziz, Master the Crypto Founder, Coins, Tokens & Altcoins: What’s the Difference?, 
MASTERTHECRYPTO, https://masterthecrypto.com/differences-between-cryptocurrency-
coins-and-tokens//(last visited Feb. 28, 2019). 
17 Ed Moffatt, Blockchain Tokens, Simply Explained, MEDIUM (Jan. 14, 2020) 
https://medium.com/@edmoffat/blockchain-tokens-simply-explained-d05d88688b65. 
18 See Aziz, supra note 16. 
316 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:311 
 
standard templates and smart contracts, which are self-executing, 
programmable computer codes.19 These tokens may be created and 
distributed to the public through what is known as an initial coin offering 
(“ICO”), though this is an apparent misnomer.20  
C. Utility Tokens vs. Security Tokens 
The two most prevalent types of tokens issued through ICOs are utility 
tokens and security tokens.21 The main difference between the two 
categories of tokens is their intended use and functionality.22 Utility tokens 
are not issued in the form of an investment, whereas security tokens 
resemble traditional securities.23 Utility tokens are user tokens that enable 
access to future products or services offered by a company.24 
Alternatively, security tokens are digital assets that derive their value from 
a tradeable asset and entitle their holders to certain ownership rights of the 
company.25 The main difference between the two categories of tokens is 
that security tokens have to comply with federal securities laws while 
utility tokens do not.26  
The SEC has primarily used the Howey test to classify the two types 
of tokens.27 However, given the ability of both categories of tokens to earn 
profit and appreciate in value, it is difficult to clearly delineate the 
difference between the two.28 Due to their similarities, utility token 
 
19 See Aziz, supra note 16. 
20 See Arjun Kharpal, Tokenization: The world of ICOs, CNBC (Jul. 16, 2018), 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Rule-18-Handout-
1.Secara-1.pdf (last updated Apr. 12, 2019) (“[T]he term ICO is actually a misnomer 
because it implies a similarity to an IPO. ICOs, or as we prefer to call them ‘Token 
Generation Events’ (TGEs), are fundamentally different than IPOs in that an IPO is 
conducted by a mature company with a live product and revenue, while a TGE represents 
the birth of a new currency which powers a network.”). 
21 Katalyse, Io, Security Tokens vs. Utility Tokens— How different are they?, 
CRYPTODIGEST (Jul. 27, 2018), https://cryptodigestnews.com/security-tokens-vs-utility-
tokens-how-different-are-they-8a439c73e616. 
22 Id.  
23 Tamer Sameeh, ICO Basics- the difference between security tokens and utility tokens, 
COINTELLIGENCE (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.cointelligence.com/content/ico-basics-
security-tokens-vs-utility-tokens/ (“To sum up security tokens entitle their holders with 
ownership rights, whereas utility tokens can be thought of as coupons that grant holders 
access to certain products or services.”). 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 Complete Guide to Security Tokens: How they Work Explained Simply, THE TOKENIST, 
https://thetokenist.io/security-tokens-explained/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2019). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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developers prefer to call ICOs involving these categories of tokens “token 
generation events.”29 
D. What is an ICO? 
ICOs have become extremely popular in the last few years as a means 
of raising capital for virtual projects. According to the latest statistics, over 
$7 billion was raised via ICOs in the U.S. in 2018 alone.30 In fact, the U.S. 
takes the lead when it comes to conducting ICOs, evidenced by the graph 
below: 31  
 
 
Despite a sharp increase in the amount of funds raised via ICOs from 
the prior year, the number of ICOs appears to be declining in 2019.32 This 
significant pullback may be a result of companies choosing to fund their 
cryptocurrency projects through means compliant with the securities 
 
29 Sameeh, supra note 23. 
30 Funds Raised in 2018, ICODATA.IO, https://www.icodata.io/stats/2018 (last visited Mar. 
1, 2019). 
31 ICO Funds and Trends Analysis 2018, INWARA, https://www.inwara.com/report/annual-
report-
2018?utm_source=annualrepecryphub&utm_medium=annualrepecryphub&utm_campaig
n=annualrepecryphub (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). 
32 Ajit Tripathi, RIP ICOs: 2019 Will Be the Year of Enterprise Blockchain Tokens, 
COINDESK (Jan. 6, 2019), https://www.coindesk.com/r-i-p-icos-2019-will-be-the-year-of-
enterprise-blockchain-tokens. 
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laws.33 Yet despite the slowdown, some companies are still choosing to 
use ICOs to raise funds.34 So, what exactly is an ICO?  
“An ICO is a fundraising event, effected using distributed 
ledger technology, in which a “token” or “coin” is offered 
to a participant in return for either cash (fiat currency) or 
cryptocurrency, such as Ether or Bitcoin. A token entitles 
its holders to various rights, which typically include the 
right to use a service to be developed and offered by the 
issuer. The proceeds of the token sale are used to fund a 
venture or a project undertaken by the ICO sponsors. 
Similar to equity securities, however, tokens sold in ICOs 
may also confer profit rights, may appreciate in value, and 
can be traded. ICO tokens do not represent an ownership 
interest in a venture.”35 
In 2013 the first ever ICO took place, opening the door to this 
alternative method of funding for emerging companies.36 ICOs also bear 
similarities to traditional IPOs because investors can earn a return on their 
digital asset instrument—usually by selling their tokens on the secondary 
market once value is created and the digital project takes off.37 
The ICO process typically begins when a development team 
announces an ICO through an online channel, such as a cryptocurrency 
website or forum.38 This announcement will likely include access to the 
 
33 Elizabeth Gail, Muliti-Billion Dollar ICO Market Down to A Few Hundred Million, 
COINCENTRAL (Sep. 13, 2018), https://coincentral.com/multibillion-dollar-ico-market-
down/. 
34 The ICO is Dead…Or Is It?, INVEST IN BLOCKCHAIN (Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://www.investinblockchain.com/ico-is-dead/. 
35 David Felsenthal et al., SEC Brings Enforcement Against Initial Coin Offering, 
CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2017/10/sec-
brings-first-enforcement-action-against-initial-coin-offering.pdf.  
36 Howard Marks, The ICO is Dead. Long Live the ICO 2.0., HACKERNOON (Feb. 21, 2018) 
https://hackernoon.com/the-ico-is-dead-long-live-the-ico-2-0-7bb269987513 (“It turns out 
the first ever ICO was Mastercoin (now called Omni), which raised 5,000 Bitcoin at a total 
value of $500,000 in 2013. Mastercoin organized a foundation called the Mastercoin 
Foundation to receive the Bitcoin and manage the project.”). 
37 William Hinman, Dir., SEC Div. of Corp. Fin., Remarks at the Yahoo Finance All 
Markets Summit: Crypto Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic), 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-
hinman-061418#_ftn3.  
38 Rocky Mui, Initial Coin Offerings, Asking the Right Regulatory Questions, CLIFFORD 
CHANCE LLP (May 2018), 
https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2018/05/initial-
coin-offerings-asking-the-right-regulatory-questions.pdf. 
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project’s website, which will feature “white paper,” a crucial instrument 
of the ICO process.39 The white paper will describe the project, key terms 
of the ICO, including subscription details, a timeline, the roadmap for the 
project, how the funds will be used and why the project is useful40—
essentially all the information a prospective investor would need in 
deciding on whether they should invest in the project.41 The white paper 
should provide key information to potential investors in a friendly 
manner42 because, oftentimes, ICOs are held before the project is in a 
profit-generating state, meaning developers must focus on building 
confidence in their project so that they can receive necessary funding.43 
The development team also creates a webpage and a group chat to keep 
interested investors in the loop.44 These webpages and group chats provide 
updates about development and important, upcoming dates.45   
The development team will also provide a pre-sale, which is accessible 
for certain people who register for the “white list”, prior to launching the 
ICO.46 The pre-sale is held for a specified period of time, allowing those 
with access to exchange their coins47 for the project’s new tokens at a 
lower price.48 Until the project is actually released, however, the tokens 
will have no use, and their value on secondary markets will be purely 
speculative.49 Furthermore, if the project does not reach its funding goal, 
the funds contributed are returned and the token ceases to exist.50 
Following the pre-sale, an investor may participate in a public sale by 
transferring funds to the issuer in exchange for new tokens during the 
 
39 How to Launch an ICO, A Detailed Guide, COINTELEGRAPH, 
https://cointelegraph.com/ico-101/how-to-launch-an-ico-a-detailed-guide#5-write-a-
white-paper (last visited Mar. 2, 2019). 
40 Waves Lab, How to write the white paper for an ICO project, MEDIUM (Apr. 27, 2018), 
https://medium.com/waves-lab/how-to-write-the-white-paper-for-an-ico-project-
2de3098c3407. 
41 Id.  
42 COINTELEGRAPH, supra note 39. 
43 How to Develop a White Paper for ICO: Do’s and Don’ts, COINTELEGRAPH (Aug. 21, 
2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/how-to-develop-white-paper-for-ico-dos-and-
donts. 
44  COINTELEGRAPH, supra note 39. 
45 Id. 
46 Phil Glazer, Understanding Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), HACKERNOON (Jan. 28, 2018), 
https://hackernoon.com/evaluating-an-initial-coin-offering-ico-f9c24be0698b. 
47 Id. (“When the pre-sale or public sale period happens people will contribute funds by 
sending Bitcoin (BTC) or Ethereum (ETH) to a designated wallet address.”). 
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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subscription process.51 Unlike the pre-sale, the public sale is usually open 
longer and open to all investors.52  
Despite the risk that projects may come up short, many ICOs do 
receive necessary funding to launch their platform.53 For example, in June 
2017 the EOS software developers54 raised over $4.1 billion during the 
project’s ICO alone.55 However, even though a project may receive 
necessary funding through an ICO, there is no guarantee that the project 
will be successful following its launch.56 In fact, a study suggests that more 
than half of ICO projects fail within four months of their token sales.57 
Yet despite the high risk of failure, there are alluring “advantages” of 
ICOs that may outweigh their costs. ICOs enable entrepreneurs to raise 
funds rather quickly and easily.58 Unlike conventional methods of 
fundraising, ICOs are largely unregulated.59 Ideally, ICOs give 
entrepreneur-developers an idea of the price customers will pay for their 
product or service.60 ICOs also allow for community building without 
geographic barriers, widespread exposure, and most importantly, low-cost 
fund raising.61   
 
51 Mui, supra note 38.  
52 Glazer, supra note 46.  
53 See Jeffrey Tucker, Despite What You Hear, The ICO is Not Over, FORBES (Aug. 18, 
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreytucker/2018/08/18/despite-what-you-hear-the-
ico-is-not-rip/#84b0dc031921. 
54 EOS, ICOBENCH, https://icobench.com/ico/eos (last visited Mar. 2, 2019) (“EOS.IO is 
software that introduces a blockchain architecture designed to enable vertical and 
horizontal scaling of decentralized applications (the ‘EOS.IO Software’). This is achieved 
through an operating system-like construct upon which applications can be built. The 
software provides accounts, authentication, databases, asynchronous communication and 
the scheduling of applications across multiple CPU cores and/or clusters. The resulting 
technology is a blockchain architecture that has the potential to scale to millions of 
transactions per second, eliminates user fees and allows for quick and easy deployment of 
decentralized applications.”). 
55 Id. 
56 See Daniel Palmer, More Than Half of ICOs Fail Within 4 Months, Study Suggests, 
COINDESK (Jul. 10, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/over-half-of-icos-fail-within-4-
months-suggests-us-study. 
57 Id. 
58 Glazer, supra note 46.  
59 Theodore Schleifer, Silicon Valley is obsessed with ICOs- here’s why, RECODE (Sept. 19, 
2017 1:06 pm EDT), https://www.recode.net/2017/9/19/16243110/initial-coin-offering-
ico-explained-what-is-money-bitcoin-digital-currency. 
60 Betsey Vereckey, The pros and cons of ICOs for entrepreneurs, MIT SLOAN SCHOOL OF 
MANAGEMENT (Apr. 12, 2018), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/pros-and-
cons-icos-entrepreneurs. 
61 See id.; see also Tucker, supra note 53.   
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However, regulators’ crackdown has been the greatest pitfall of 
conducting an ICO.62 Thus, some developers have replaced ICOs with 
airdrops.63 
E. Demystifying the Definition of an Airdrop: What is it and How 
Does it Work? 
In laymen’s terms an airdrop is the practice through which developers 
of a new cryptocurrency-based project distribute “free” tokens to 
community members (also known as “users”).64 Why are developers 
giving away “free” tokens? An airdrop may be used as a marketing tool 
and a distribution mechanism.65 With over 1,900 cryptocurrencies on the 
market today, it is vital for developers to effectively promote their new 
projects.66 Rising competition in an already saturated marketplace has led 
to new techniques for raising awareness. Rather than using ICO 
advertising—which is now banned by many online platforms (including 
Facebook)67—crypto entrepreneurs are using airdrops as a marketing 
alternative.68  
When done in a legitimate fashion, airdropping can be an effective 
marketing ploy to lift a new project off the ground.69 Not only are airdrops 
used for “obscure” tokens, but they are also used for popular tokens as 
well. In May 2018, Tron Foundation completed an airdrop of $1.7 million 
worth of its TRX tokens to community members owning Ethereum.70 Tron 
is far from obscure,  and with a market cap of over $3.8 billion it is 
considered to be one of the most valuable “cryptocurrencies” on the 
market.71  
 
62 See Vereckey, supra note 60.  
63 See Kai Sedgwick, Six Alternatives to an Initial Coin Offering, BITCOIN.COM (June 18, 
2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/six-alternatives-to-an-initial-coin-offering/.   
64 See Jake Frankenfield, Cryptocurrency Airdrop, INVESTOPEDIA,  
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/airdrop-cryptocurrency.asp (last updated Nov. 12, 
2019). 
65 Ian Lee, What is a Cryptocurrency Airdrop and How Does it Differ from an ICO?, 
COINGECKO (June 11, 2018), https://www.coingecko.com/buzz/what-is-a-cryptocurrency-
airdrop-and-howdoes-it-differ-from-an-ico?locale=en. 
66 Id. 
67 Asha Barbaschow, Facebook holds ICO ban but allows ‘approved’ cryptocurrency ads, 
ZDNET (June 27, 2018) https://www.zdnet.com/article/facebook-holds-ico-ban-but-
allows-approved-cryptocurrency-ads/. 
68 Lee, supra note 65.  
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 Id.  
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Obscure projects also might want to bolster community recognition by 
airdropping their tokens in an attempt to create “buzz.”72 Thus, developers 
rely on these distributions as well as users to create brand awareness and 
“buzz.”73   
While these airdropped tokens are touted as “free,” they ultimately 
come at a price for recipients.74 Developers anticipate that the airdrop 
recipient will perform actions that are beneficial to the project’s 
development,75 i.e., performing marketing services in exchange for 
receiving tokens.76 Despite the notion of being “free”77, airdrops often 
demand the performance of small tasks, including posting on social media 
forums, writing a blog post, or even connecting with a particular member 
of the blockchain project.78 In effect, this serves as a “lead generation and 
referral campaign,”79 shifting the promotional responsibility to the 
community members.80 These free token offerings are also used as a way 
to reward early supporters who have already invested, giving them 
additional tokens.81 Companies hope that these tactics will prompt early 
investors to hold on to their tokens. 82 
These massive token drops also function as a distribution device. 83 
Airdrops can occur in tandem with an ICO, or after an ICO takes place, 
serving as a means to disseminate tokens to the community at large.84 Once 
funds are raised for the project via token sales (ICO), developers may use 
a free token give away as a way to jump start long-term network growth.85 
 
72 See id.  
73 See generally id. 
74 Rebecca G. DiStefano & Pallav Raghuvanshi, Securities and Tax Law Effects of Token 




76 See id. 
77 Id. 
78 Frankenfield, supra note 64.  
79 Lee, supra note 65. 
80 See Michael J. Casey, Crypto Token Airdrops are A Marketing Ploy and that’s OK, 
COINDESK (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/crypto-token-airdrops-are-a-
marketing-ploy-and-thats-ok. 
81 Sudhir Khatwani, Airdrops in Cryptocurrenices, COINSUTRA (last updated Aug. 11, 
2019), https://coinsutra.com/what-is-airdrop/. 
82 Id. 
83 Lee, supra note 65. 
84 DiStefano & Raghuvanshi, supra note 75. 
85 See Shaurya Malwa, All you need to know about Crypto Airdrops. AKA Free Money, 
HACKERNOON (Mar. 1, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/all-you-need-to-know-about-
crypto-airdrops-aka-free-money-243e60b22493; see also Esteban Casatano, Why ICOs 
and airdrops don’t work, MEDIUM (Apr. 10, 2018), 
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Of course, the end goal is mass adoption of the token.86 By rewarding users 
with these “freebies,” project developers build a community for their 
token.87 Even though the users are receiving relatively small amounts of 
tokens, the audience is usually sizeable.88 This effectively creates a 
community of token holders and users.89 
This so-called “community creation” leads to awareness and may also 
lead to a greater demand for the token.90 This is because, inevitably, some 
of the users who receive the “free” tokens may do research and decide to 
acquire more of the tokens.91 Users also tend to assign a greater value to a 
token they are holding than one they encounter on the open market.92 Thus, 
this “endowment effect”93 also leads to users building up the network and 
the community surrounding the token.94 On the other hand, an advantage 
for users receiving “free” tokens is that they are able to “‘test, trade, and 
transact unfamiliar crypto assets without having to mine or invest first.”95  
An airdrop can either be announced or unannounced prior to 
distribution.96 In the case of an unannounced airdrop, users find 




86 Evelyn Cheng, Want free cryptocurrency? ‘Airdrops’ is coming, CNBC (Mar. 12, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/12/want-free-cryptocurrency-airdrops-is-coming.html. 
87 Lee, supra note 65. 
88 See Kenny Li, WTF is an Airdrop? HACKERNOON (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://hackernoon.com/all-you-need-to-know-about-crypto-airdrops-aka-free-money-
243e60b22493. 
89 Lee, supra note 65. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Akhilesh Ganti, Endowment Effect, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/endowment-effect.asp (last updated Aug. 16, 2019) 
(“Studies have shown repeatedly that people will value something that they already own 
more than a similar item they do not own.”).  
93 Id. (“[A] circumstance in which an individual places a higher value on an object that they 
already own than the value they would place on that same object if they did not own it.”).  
94 Lee, supra note 65. 
95 Marie Huillet, Blockchain.com Wallet Adds Stellar, Announces $125 Mln XLM Airdrop 
to ‘Drive Adoption’, COINTELEGRAPH (Nov. 6, 2018), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/blockchaincom-wallet-adds-stellar-announces-125-mln-
xlm-airdrop-to-drive-adoption. 
96 Airdrop List, ICO MARKS, https://icomarks.com/airdrops (last visited Jan. 5, 2019) 
(Displaying a list of active airdrops that a user may subscribe to and what requirements are 
needed to participate in each airdrop. The list also lets users know when the announced 
airdrops end.); Jack Filiba, Airdrop, COINSQUARE (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://news.coinsquare.com/learn-coinsquare/airdrops-digital-currencies/. 
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wallets.97 In some instances, the distribution is triggered when users hold 
certain cryptocurrencies or a specific number of crypto tokens in their 
wallet.98 Developers may decide to distribute tokens after taking a 
“snapshot” of a block of particular cryptocurrency, entitling those holding 
the currency (as of the date of the snapshot) to “free” tokens.99 In the case 
of announced airdrops, users can check websites that list scheduled 
airdrops and subscribe to the airdrops of their choice.100  
Airdrops are appealing to developers as a low-cost marketing strategy, 
though many critics find these “free” distributions to be an utter waste of 
time.101 Distributing too many tokens can create a surplus, diluting the 
token supply.102 There is also no guarantee that the recipients of the tokens 
will hold on to them.103 If enough of the recipients sell the token after 
receiving it, then its value will likely diminish.104 A sufficient number of 
sales may lead to the token’s demise.  
Additionally, developers often set their expectations too high.105 An 
increase in the token’s usage does not necessarily occur simply because 
users hold onto airdropped tokens.106 Nor does it mean that users view the 
tokens as anything other than spam.107 Without sufficient incentives, token 
 
97 Cryptocurrency airdrop | What is a crypto airdrop?, BEST BITCOIN ALTERNATIVE, 
https://bestbitcoinalternative.com/resources/cryptocurrency-airdrop/ (last visited Jan. 8, 
2019). 
98 See Crypto Account Builders, Beginners Guide to Crypto Airdrops: Free Coins 
& Tokens, MEDIUM (Oct. 5, 2018) https://medium.com/@johnhinkle_80891/beginners-
guide-to-crypto-airdrops-free-coins-tokens-643a7327709b. 
99 See Ermos Kyriakides, All You Need to Know About Airdrops, HACKERNOON (July 31, 
2018), https://hackernoon.com/all-you-need-to-know-about-airdrops-98b1b5af7941. 
100 See AIRDROP ALERT.COM, https://airdropalert.com/about-us (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) 
(“AirdropAlert.com launched June 2017 to create awareness to the crypto community 
about the existence of airdrops. We believe majority of crypto fanatics are not aware of the 
concept of airdrops and how to claim it. We started an informational page where you can 
find data on when and where airdrops take place. We started as a team of 3 to collect data 
on airdrops and list them. With the rapid growth of airdrops, visitors and subscribers we 
quickly expended to a team of 15. Our goal is to provide information about legitimate ways 
to collect free cryptocurrency. Due to demand of ICOs we started the concept of Exclusive 
Airdrops that are hosted by us. We have hosted, promoted, marketed and distributed 
airdrops for over 30 ICOs.”).  
101 Nathan Reiff, Cryptocurrency Forks Vs. Airdrops: What’s the Difference?, 
INVESTOPEDIA, (July 3, 2018) https://www.investopedia.com/tech/cryptocurrency-
forks-vs-airdrops-whats-difference/.  
102  Id. 
103 See id.  
104 See Casatano, supra note 86. 
105 See id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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holders will stray away from using the product and in turn the network will 
not grow.108  
In fact, each holder is more apt to free ride on the growth of the 
network than to promote or use it themselves.109 These speculative users 
might even have a negative impact on the network since there are only a 
finite number of tokens and they are holding on to them when other users 
would use them.110 Thus, opponents to airdrops view the distributions as 
“flawed” because the recipients are motivated by the promise of “free” 
money with no real incentives to use the product, increase its utility, or 
grow the network. 111 However, for some companies the benefits 
overshadow the inconveniences of conducting a “free” token giveaway. 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE SEC’S DEVELOPING JURISDICTION 
OVER DIGITAL ASSETS 
Following the Great Crash of 1929, Congress created the SEC to 
“protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and 
facilitate capital formation.”112 This mission is based on the simple 
concept that “all investors, whether large institutions or private 
individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an investment 
prior to buying it, and so long as they hold it.”113 To achieve this mission, 
the SEC requires full and fair disclosure so that investors may make use 
of this information for any transactions where they are buying, selling or 
holding a security.114 Only through the flow of timely, comprehensive and 
accurate information can people make “sound investment decisions.”115  
For an investor to be afforded with protection from the SEC, a security 
must be involved.116 Thus, determining the reach of the SEC’s jurisdiction 
 
108 See Alex Munkachy, A Detailed Guide to Avoiding Airdrop and Bounty Scams, COINIQ 
(Sept. 9, 2018), https://coiniq.com/airdrop-bounty-scams/. 
109 See Casatano, supra note 86.  
110 See id. 
111 Id.  
112 About the SEC: What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last modified June 10, 2013). 
113 Id. 
114 Id.  
115 Id. 
116 Eva Su, Digital Assets and  SEC regulation, CONG. RES. SERV. (Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20200130_R46208_8c73c5838d376d44e3d841ead
7bb65df15744fb3.pdf (“Securities regulation generally applies to all securities, whether 
they are digital or traditional. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the 
primary regulator overseeing securities offerings, sales, and investment activities. The 
SEC’s mission is to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and 
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over cryptocurrency transactions is difficult.117 Yet, the Commission is 
actively attempting to protect investors from the risks involved in digital 
asset transactions, announcing initiatives such as  the creation of the Cyber 
Unit,118 which is tasked with investigating digital misconduct and fraud to 
protect retail investors.119  
In light of the recent craze in cryptocurrencies, the SEC has attempted 
to clarify its position regarding digital tokens, ICOs, and cryptocurrency 
itself. Released in July 2017, the Decentralized Autonomous Organization  
(“DAO”) report marked the first instance where the SEC memorialized its 
position on the nature of digital tokens.120 Today, digital assets can 
function as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, or store value.121 
Increasingly, however, these tokens are being used to represent other types 
of rights, like the right to participate in earning the developer’s profits.122 
Depending on the situation, these other rights may cause the digital assets 
to be labeled as securities.123 
 
facilitate capital formation. The existing securities regulatory regime generally aligns with 
this mission, and the SEC’s digital asset regulation generally follows the same regime.”). 
117 Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-
clayton-2017- 12-11 (“It has been asserted that cryptocurrencies are not securities and that 
the offer and sale of cryptocurrencies are beyond the SEC’s jurisdiction. Whether that 
assertion proves correct with respect to any digital asset that is labeled as a cryptocurrency 
will depend on the characteristics and use of that particular asset.”). 
118 SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives to Combat Cyber-Based Threats and Protect 
Retail Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2017-176 (last visited Mar. 2, 2019). 
119 Mitchell Moos, SEC’s New Cyber Unit Tasked with Blockchain Securities Fraud, 
CRYPTOSLATE (Apr. 23, 2018), https://cryptoslate.com/secs-new-cyber-unit-tasked-with-
blockchain-securities-fraud/ (“According to Stephanie Avakian, Co-Director of the SEC’s 
Enforcement Division: ‘Cyber-related threats and misconduct are among the greatest risks 
facing investors and the securities industry. The Cyber Unit will enhance our ability to 
detect and investigate cyber threats through increasing expertise in an area of critical 
national importance.’”).  
120 See Report of Investigation Pursuant to 21(a) of the Sec. & Exch. Act of 1934: The DAO, 
Exchange Act Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [hereinafter Report of 
Investigation]. 
121 Ximeng Tang, Seventy Years after Howey: An Overview of the SEC’s Developing 
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A.  Categorizing Crypto – Different Tokens Means Different 
Treatment 
Because its jurisdiction is limited to “securities”, the SEC provided its 
position on the cryptocurrencies it considers securities and which 
cryptocurrencies are not.124 In doing so, the SEC broadly grouped these 
digital assets into three categories: currency, utility tokens, and security 
tokens.125 SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has further clarified the agency’s 
position with regard to the first category: “These are replacements for 
sovereign currencies, replace the dollar, the euro, the yen with bitcoin, 
[t]hat type of currency is not a security.”126 Since the SEC does not have 
jurisdiction over transactions in currencies or commodities the 
distinction between the categories is significant.127 In contrast, Clayton 
addressed “token[s], or a digital asset[s] used in a fundraising process” as 
securities.128 This helps to further distinguish the two tokens since utility 
tokens are not created for fundraising or investment purposes.129  
Establishing jurisdiction over the two categories of tokens is trickier, 
especially after the release of the DAO Report.130 The DAO Report warned 
issuers of potential liability associated with issuing security tokens, 
thereby prompting issuers to find creative ways to avoid their tokens being 
labelled as security tokens.131 For example, crypto-companies issued so-
called “utility” tokens to raise funds for development.132 By mislabeling 
their tokens, issuers sought to avoid friction with regulators, though this 
tactic did not last.133 The SEC addressed this tactic, most notably in the 
 
124 Kate Rooney, SEC’s Clayton needs to see key upgrades in cryptocurrency markets 
before approving a bitcoin ETF, CNBC (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/27/sec-wants-key-upgrades-in-crypto-markets-before-
approving-bitcoin-etf.html (“The SEC has said explicitly that bitcoin and ether are treated 
as commodities and therefore aren’t subject to that test. But all other cryptocurrencies are 
still seen by the SEC as securities and need to register with the agency.”). 
125 Stefan Stankovic, State of Play: The SEC’s Current Positions on Cryptocurrency, 
CRYPTO BRIEFING (Aug. 20, 2018), https://cryptobriefing.com/state-of-play-the-secs-
current-positions-on-cryptocurrency/.  
126 Kate Rooney, SEC chief says agency won’t change securities laws to cater to 
cryptocurrencies, CNBC (June 6, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/06/sec-
chairman-clayton-says-agency-wont-change-definition-of-a-security.html. 
127 Stankovic, supra note 127. 
128 Rooney, supra note 128. 
129 Katalyse, Security Tokens v. Utility Tokens- How different are they?, HACKERNOON 
(Sep. 26, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/security-tokens-vs-utility-tokens-how-different-
are-they-22d6be8901c2.  
130 Tang, supra note 121. 
131  Id. 
132 Tang, supra note 121. 
133 Audrey Nesbitt, Security Tokens, Utility Tokens and the Evolution of Cryptocurrency, 
MEDIUM (Nov. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/datadriveninvestor/security-tokens-utility-
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Munchee Order.134 On December 11, 2017, the SEC issued a cease and 
desist order against Munchee Inc. for offering and selling unregistered 
security tokens.135 Although the California company labeled its MUN 
tokens as utility tokens, the SEC found the tokens were security tokens 
pursuant to the Howey test. 136  
Chairman Clayton further vocalized the SEC’s stance on issuer’s 
mislabeling strategy: 
“[m]erely calling a token a “utility” token or structuring it 
to provide some utility does not prevent the token from 
being a security.137 Tokens and offerings that incorporate 
features and marketing efforts that emphasize the 
potential for profits based on the entrepreneurial or 
managerial efforts of others continue to contain the 
hallmarks of a security under U.S. law.”138  
The blurred line between utility tokens and security tokens has led to 
SEC investigations of cases involving digital tokens on an ad hoc basis, 
applying the Howey test to the particular facts and circumstances in each 
case.139 
B. The Howey Test: Pulling Apart the Prongs 
The SEC’s regulation of cryptocurrency has been difficult because the 
agency lacks power to create new laws or modify existing ones. Therefore, 
the SEC must rely on the Howey test to determine whether certain tokens 
and transactions are within its jurisdiction, and whether these items can be 
properly classified as securities.140  
 
tokens-and-the-evolution-of-cryptocurrency-5f1bdcde1845 (“The majority of tokens 
released in 2017 claimed to be utility tokens to avoid any friction with the SEC but in fact, 
they were actually security tokens.”). 




137 Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-
clayton-2017- 12-11; see also Hinman, supra note 37.  
138 Id.  
139 Id. 
140 Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-
analysis-digital-assets (“The Securities Act of 1933 defines a ‘security’ in part as ‘an 
investment contract,’ the definition of which was set forth by the Supreme Court in the 
landmark case SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.”).  
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Director of the  U.S. SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance, William 
Hinman, specifically addressed application of the Howey test to digital 
asset transactions in July 2018, marking an important milestone for the 
agency.141 A transaction involving a “security” automatically triggers 
application of the federal securities laws, permitting the SEC to step in.142 
The Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), have nearly identical definitions143 for the 
term “security”, which is broadly defined to furnish investors with as much 
protection as possible.144 Whether a token is a security also becomes 
crucial for token issuers and people who facilitate the promotion and 
issuance of tokens because of liability under the federal securities laws.145  
The definition of security denotes a laundry list of instruments deemed 
to be securities, including “investment contracts.”146 The Supreme Court 
demarcated the boundaries of this vague term through its decision in SEC 
v. W.J. Howey Co.147 In Howey, an investment contract was defined as “a 
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person (1) invests his money 
(2) in a common enterprise and (3) is led to expect profits (4) solely from 
the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”148  
In determining whether the underlying transaction meets the Howey 
test, emphasis is placed on its economic implications rather than the name 
provided by its creator.149 Examining the economic realities of each 
 
141 Id. (Hinman analogized the digital assets, which are essentially computer codes, to 
orange groves in Howey: “Just as in the Howey case, tokens and coins are often touted 
as assets that have a use in their own right, coupled with a promise that the assets will be 
cultivated in a way that will cause them to grow in value, to be sold later at a profit.”). 
142 See generally Division of Enforcement and Trading and Markets, Statement on 
Potentially Unlawful Online Platforms for Trading Digital Assets, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/enforcement-tm-
statement-potentially-unlawful-online-platforms-trading. 
143 See 15. U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (1933) ; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1934); see also 
SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004) (holding that, while these definitions are not 
identical, the U.S. Supreme Court has “treated [them] as essentially identical in meaning”). 
144 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 60-61 (1990) (“Congress painted with a broad 
brush. It recognized the virtually limitless scope of human ingenuity, especially in the 
creation of  ‘countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the 
money of others on the promise of profits,’ and determined that the best way to achieve its 
goal of protecting investors was to define the term 'security' in sufficiently broad and 
general terms so as to include within that definition the many types of instruments that in 
our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.”). 
145 Tang, supra note 121. 
146 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (1934); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012). 
147 See generally SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
148 Id.; see also BRENT A. OLSON, PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS HANDBOOK § 4:10 
(2019). 
149 See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 853 (1975); see also Reves, 
494 U.S. at 61 (“In discharging our duty, we are not bound by legal formalisms, but instead 
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transaction aligns with Congress’ purpose in enacting the Federal 
securities laws: “to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made 
and by whatever name they are called.”150 Emerging as the “catchall 
category” for securities that do not fit plainly within the definition of 
“security,” the term “investment contract” embodies a flexible standard, 
and is capable of adapting to meet various schemes.151  
The first prong of the Howey test requires an investment of money, 
though this should not be read literally.152 An investment of money does 
not need to be money per se. Instead, “the ‘investment’ may take the form 
of ‘goods and services,’153 or some other ‘exchange of value’”.154 Both 
courts and regulators interpret “money” broadly, reflecting the flexible 
nature of the federal securities laws.155  
The second prong, commonality, is established where it is shown that 
investors have interrelated interests in a common scheme.156 In analyzing 
whether  a “common enterprise” exists, the courts look to three different 
approaches: the horizontal approach, the broad vertical approach and the 
narrow vertical approach.157 The horizontal approach focuses on the 
relationship among investors in an economic venture, looking to whether 
investors “share the risks and benefits of the business enterprise.”158 The 
narrow vertical approach assesses commonality with regard to whether the 
promoter and investor are both exposed to risk and the profits and losses 
of each are interwoven.159 The broad vertical approach is less constrictive 
 
take account of the economics of the transaction under investigation.”); see 
also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (“[I]n searching for the meaning and 
scope of the word ‘security’. . . form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis 
should be on economic reality.”). 
150 SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 396 (2004) (“Congress[] inten[ded] to regulate all of 
the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of 
others on the promise of profits.”) (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 
(1946)). 
151 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301 (“investment contract” is not a defined term, rather “[i]t 
embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet 
the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of 
others on the promise of profits.”).  
152 Id. 
153 See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979) (an investment may 
take the form of “goods and “services” rather than just “cash”). 
154 See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1471 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining an exchange 
of value satisfies the first prong of the Howey test). 
155 See id. 
156 See generally Howey, 328 U.S. at  293. 
157 Ryan Borneman, Why the Common Enterprise Test Lacks a Common Definition: A Look 
Into the Supreme Court's Decision of SEC v. Edwards, 5 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 16 (2005), 
https://blj.ucdavis.edu/archives/vol-5-no-2/why-the-common-enterprise-test.html#_ftn25. 
158 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002). 
159 Borneman, supra note 159. 
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because it requires only that the profits and losses of the investor and 
promoter be related in some fashion.160 The “pooling”161 of investors’ 
assets is the integral part of the horizontal approach, making it more 
difficult to satisfy because it depends on the coordination of multiple 
investors.162 
The third prong of the Howey test is crucial and weighs heavily on the 
overall investment contract determination.163 This prong is met when 
shown that investors are led to believe there is a reasonable expectation of 
profits and where they are motivated by financial return, rather than by 
consumption of the goods or services received.164 Simply stated, it must 
be shown that investors are expecting profits in return for their investment. 
Finally, the last prong of the Howey Test requires that expected profits 
come “solely from the efforts of others.” “Solely” should not be 
interpreted literally,165 but should represent situations where investors 
have passive roles in the success or failure of the investment.166 The 
instrument is typically considered a security where the promoter or issuer 
remains in control over the managerial conduct of the investment and the 
investor is unable to participate in decision making.167   
 
160 Payphones, 300 F.3d at 1284 (“Broad vertical commonality . . . only requires a movant 
to show that the investors are dependent upon the expertise or efforts of the investment 
promoter for their returns . . . .”). 
161 Id. at 1283-84 (“Most circuits that have considered the issue find it satisfied where a 
movant shows 'horizontal commonality,' that is the 'pooling' of investors' funds as a result 
of which the individual investors share all the risks and benefits of the business 
enterprise.”). 
162 Jeffrey A. Bekiares, Esq., What is the Howey Test? How to Tell if a Coin Passes the Test, 
SMART UP LEGAL (July 20, 2018), https://www.smartuplegal.com/learn-center/what-is-
the-howey-test- how-to-tell-if-a-coin-passes-the-test/. 
163 Hinman, supra note 37 (“What are some of the factors to consider in assessing whether 
a digital asset is offered as an investment contract and is thus a security? Primarily, consider 
whether a third party – be it a person, entity or coordinated group of actors – drives the 
expectation of a return. That question will always depend on the particular facts and 
circumstances[.]”). 
164 See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975) (describing a 
security transaction as “an investment where one parts with his money in the hope of 
receiving profits from the efforts of others, and not where he purchases a commodity for 
personal consumption or living quarters for personal use.”). 
165 Hirsch v. Dupont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1218-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d, 553 F.2d 750 (2d 
Cir. 1977).  
166 A Securities Law Framework for Blockchain Tokens, COINBASE (last updated Dec. 7, 
2016), https://www.coinbase.com/legal/securities-law-framework.pdf.  
167 See Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that “an 
investment contract can exist where the investor is required to perform some duties, as long 
as they are nominal or limited and would have little direct effect upon receipt by the 
participants of the benefits promised by the promoters.”). 
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C. Registration Requirements 
1. Securities Act of 1933 
Once a token is labeled a security it must be registered unless it 
otherwise qualifies under an exemption.168 Enacted in 1933, the Securities 
Act regulates the offer and sale of securities within the United States.169 
Specifically, Section 5(a)and 5(c) of the act prohibit the offer and sale of 
unregistered securities unless an exemption is available that negates the 
registration requirement.170 Section 5 is a mechanism for regulating the 
timeline and distribution process for issuers offering securities for sale.171  
Like the term “security”, Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act broadly 
defines the terms “offer” and “sale”:172 “Any attempt or offer to dispose 
of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for 
value”173 constitutes an offer, and a sale is defined as “every disposition 
 
168 Small Business: Exempt Offerings, U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N (last modified Feb. 7, 
2020), https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/exemptofferings (illustrating the different 
exemptions to registration, which include Regulation Crowdfunding, Regulation D, and 
Regulation A). 
169 See generally Fast Answers: The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC & 
EXCH. COMM’N (last modified Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-
lawsshtml.html. 
170 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(e)(a) (1933) (explaining that Section 5(a) of the Securities Act of 
1933 prohibits the offer and sale of securities through interstate commerce and the mails: 
“Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or 
medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or 
in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for 
the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b(e)(c) (explaining 
that Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits the offer and sale of securities 
unless a registration statement is filed: “ It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in 
interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium 
of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to 
such security, or while the registration statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop order 
or (prior to the effective date of the registration statement) any public proceeding or 
examination under section 8.”) ; see generally U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 171. 
171 Osama Khan, Robert Weber and Robert L. Wernli, Jr., Airdrop of Crypto Tokens Hits 
Regulatory Flak, NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/airdrop-crypto-tokens-hits-regulatory-flak. 
172 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (1933) (“The term ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ shall include every contract 
of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value. The term ‘offer to 
sell’, ‘offer for sale’, or ‘offer’ shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or 
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.”). 
173 Id.; see also Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 875 (2d Cir. 1971) (explaining 
that the definition has been interpreted as going well beyond the common law concept of 
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of a security or interest in a security, for value.”174  Thus, an offer might 
be interpreted to include any activity on the part of the issuer which affects 
the public by conditioning the market.175  For purposes of Section 5, an 
offer and sale can occur even if there is no exchange of monetary 
consideration.176  While a bona fide gift would not implicate Section 5, in 
situations where the “donor derives some benefit from the purported gift, 
the transaction will be treated as a sale.”177 
2. Exchange Act of 1934 
i. Securities Exchanges 
In addition to the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 mandates registration requirements for a 
variety of market participants, including any broker, dealer or exchange.178 
Section 5 of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful to operate a securities 
exchange without registering with the SEC, unless the exchange operates 
under a registration exemption.179 Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act 
defines an “exchange” as: 
“any organization, association, or group of persons, 
whether incorporated or unincorporated, which 
constitutes, maintains, or provides a market place or 
facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of 
securities or for otherwise performing with respect to 
securities the functions commonly performed by a stock 
exchange as that term is generally understood, and 
includes the market place and the market facilities 
maintained by such exchange.”180  
 
an offer to encompass circumstances that would require the protection of the securities 
laws). 
174 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (1933); see also SEC v. Datronics Engineers, Inc., 490 F.2d 250, 
253 (4th Cir. 1973) (explaining that the entire transaction must be considered to determine 
whether value was received). 
175 SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, Securities Offering Reform Memorandum, (Aug. 2, 
2005), 
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SecuritiesOfferingReformFullText.pdf. 
176 See Dror Futter, You Can’t Even Give Them Away …No, Seriously, CROWDFUND INSIDER 
(Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2018/08/137933-ico-tokens-the-sec-
you-cant-even-give-them-away-no-seriously/.  
177 2 Thomas Lee Hazen, Law of Securities Regulation, § 5.1 (6th ed. 2009).  
178 See generally U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 171. 
179 15 U.S.C. § 78e (2018). 
180 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2018). 
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To determine whether a trading system meets the definition of 
“exchange”, the SEC looks to Exchange Act Rule 3b-16(a), which 
provides a functional two-part test: whether the trading system “(1) 
[b]rings together the orders for securities of multiple buyers and sellers; 
and (2) [u]ses established, non-discretionary methods (whether by 
providing a trading facility or by setting rules) under which such orders 
interact with each other, and the buyers and sellers entering such orders 
agree to the terms of a trade.”181 The SEC will take relevant facts and 
circumstances into account when evaluating an entity’s characterization of 
its trading system, looking to the activity actually occurring between the 
buyers and sellers rather than the technology or terminology used by the 
entity to determine whether the system operates as an exchange.182 
Moreover, the term “order” is broadly construed and labels assigned to 
trading interests are disregarded for the actual activities taking place on 
the system.183  
This exchange analysis also includes an evaluation of the totality of 
activities and technology used to bring orders of buyers and sellers 
together on the system.184 If the system displays, or otherwise represents, 
trading interests entered on a system to users or centrally receives orders 
for processing and execution, then it meets the first prong of the test.185 
Additionally, the second prong is easily met if set rules or a trading facility 
is provided.186 A system that meets the criteria of the test must register as 
a national securities exchange under Section 6 of the Exchange Act, as 
proscribed by Section 5.187  
ii. Broker-Dealers 
Under Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act, absent an exemption, it is 
unlawful for any broker or dealer to induce the purchase or sale of any 
 
181 17 CFR § 240.3b-16 (2018). 
182 See Division of Enforcement and Trading and Markets, Statement on Digital Asset 




184 Id.  
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 See 17 CFR § 240.3b-16 (2018) (explaining Exchange Act Rule 3b-16(b) explicitly 
excludes certain systems that the Commission believes are not exchanges, and a system is 
not included in the Commission’s interpretation of ‘exchange’ if: (1) the system fails to 
meet the two-part test in paragraph (a) of Rule 3(b)-16; (2) the system falls within one of 
the exclusions in paragraph (b) of Rule 3b-16; or (3) the Commission otherwise 
conditionally or unconditionally exempts the system from the definition); see also 15 
U.S.C. § 78f (2018); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2018). 
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security, unless the requisite registration requirements are satisfied in 
accordance with section 15(b).188 This section requires brokers and dealers 
utilizing exchange facilities to effect transactions to register with the SEC 
and become members of a self-regulatory organization, like Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).189 Section 3(a)(4) defines a 
broker as “any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in 
securities for the account of others,”190 while section 3(a)(5) defines a 
“dealer” as “any person engaged in the business of buying and selling 
securities for such person's own account through a broker or otherwise.”191 
These definitions are interpreted broadly and a “person” can include an 
entity.192 As with the foregoing “exchange determination,” a functional 
approach must be used to assess whether an entity meets the definition of 
a broker dealer.193 Thus, SEC-registered broker-dealers are subject to 
regulatory and legal requirements that govern their conduct in the 
marketplace.194   
In sum, these registration requirements provide important safeguards 
for main street investors while also promoting market stability by 
encouraging an informed investment, so that capital is allocated 
efficiently.   
D. Regulating ICOs 
Based on the federal regulatory framework administered by the SEC, 
the first step in regulating ICOs is determining whether an ICO involves 
the sale of utility or security tokens. As previously discussed, security 
tokens fall within the SEC’s jurisdiction because they resemble traditional 
investment vehicles, i.e., securities. Therefore, similar to offering and 
selling traditional securities, offerings of security tokens require SEC 
registration.195 This is one of the reasons ICOs have come under immense 
scrutiny196 as most, if not all, ICOs have not been registered with the 
SEC.197 
Before the ICO boom in the latter half of 2017, the SEC issued an 
investigative report (“DAO Report”) that applied the federal securities 
 
188 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 180; see also 15 U.S.C. §78o (a-b) (1934). 
189 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 180. 
190 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2018). 
191 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (2018). 
192 See U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 171.  
193 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 180. 
194 Id. 
195 See Clayton, supra note 1.  
196 Id. 
197 Id. (“Investors should understand that to date no initial coin offerings have been 
registered with the SEC.”). 
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laws to the Decentralized Autonomous Organization’s (“DAO”) token 
distribution during it’s ICO. 198 The DAO token offering raised around 
$150 million, catching the eyes of regulators, even though they did not 
pursue any enforcement action.199 Applying the Howey test to the DAO 
tokens led the SEC to conclude that the tokens acted as securities, and 
therefore the DAO ICO was an unregistered offering of securities.200 The 
DAO Report reiterated the fact that the federal securities laws would 
require registration of ICOs distributing security tokens and reminded 
issuers that a platform meeting the definition of “exchange” would need 
to be registered under the Exchange Act.201  
Unfortunately, rather than heeding the warning of the SEC, many 
issuers mistook the report for an opportunity to test the SEC’s limits. 
However, after the DAO Report, the SEC issued a cease and desist order 
[to DAO?], signifying its new policy towards unregistered ICOs.202 In In 
re Munchee Inc., the SEC found that Munchee Inc.’s ICO was an 
unregistered offering of securities and concluded that the company 
violated the registration requirements under Section 5 of the Securities 
Act.203 Since Munchee, the SEC has sued on a number of cases involving 
ICOs, both successfully and unsuccessfully,204 as evidenced in the chart 
below:205   
 
 
198 See Report of Investigation, supra note 122. 
199 Id.  
200 Id. 
201 Id.; see also Tang, supra note 123. 
202 In re Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445 (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf.  
203 Id. 
204 See generally Cybersecurity Enforcement Actions, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (last 
updated Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersecurity-enforcement-actions. 
205 Alex Sunnarborg, The Incoming Wave of ICO Regulation (Yes, It’s Coming), COINDESK 
(Nov. 3, 2018) https://www.coindesk.com/the-incoming-wave-of-ico-regulation-yes-its-
coming. 




Particularly, in November 2018, the SEC announced a settlement with 
two companies that were charged with the offer and sale of unregistered 
securities.206 The companies both sold digital tokens in ICOs, marking the 
first cases where the SEC imposed civil penalties solely for ICO securities 
offering violations.207 Co-Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, 
Stephanie Ativan, warned other issuers that “[t]hese cases tell those who 
are considering taking similar actions that [the SEC] continue[s] to be on 
the lookout for violations of the federal securities laws with respect to 
digital assets.”208 However, the SEC’s approach to regulating ICOs was 
brought into question when a federal court denied the agency’s motion for 
a preliminary injunction enjoining the ICO of Blockvest, LLC.209  
 
206 Two ICO Issuers Settle SEC Registration Charges, Agree to Register Tokens as 
Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Press Release No. 2018-264 (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-264. 
207 Id. 
208 Id.  
209 Daniel McAvoy, SEC imposes penalties and provides path to compliance for 
unregistered ICOs and digital asset exchanges, NIXON PEABODY (Dec. 14, 2018), 
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On the front lines, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton articulated his 
disapproval of unregistered ICOs, warning cryptocurrency entrepreneurs 
to “get their act together” by registering their ICOs with the SEC to avoid 
running into problems down the road.210 Clayton’s remark comes after the 
SEC announced its first civil penalties against two crypto companies for 
violating the registration requirements.211 Clayton has previously spoken 
out about regulating ICOs as securities, stating that “[t]here are none that 
I’ve seen that aren’t securities . . . [and] [t]o the extent something is a 
security, we should regulate it as a security.”212  
Registration is an important mechanism for investors because it 
provides them with adequate information regarding important financial 
information about a company’s securities. Without a registration statement 
on file, investors are left in the dark and might be lured into investing into 
fraudulent schemes. For example, a recent study revealed that over 80% 
of ICOs are scams.213 Thus, due to the popularity of ICOs, investors need 
the protection of the SEC now more than ever.  
In an effort to protect people from fraudulent ICOs, social media and 
search engine giants have gone as far as banning advertising and sponsored 
posts relating to ICOs and cryptocurrencies.214 Facebook first announced 
its ban in early 2018, with Google, Snapchat and Twitter following suit 
shortly after.215 Yet it is unlikely that ICOs will halt entirely anytime soon, 
even though their use has declined due to increased regulatory action and 
bans by online advertising giants. Instead, risk-averse developers have 
turned to airdrops as an alternative way to create buzz and separate their 
projects from the dense token landscape.216  
E. Platform Regulation 
The SEC seeks to regulate trading platforms as an alternative way to 




210 Andrew Ramonas, SEC Chair Tells Unregistered ICOs to ‘Get Your Act Together’, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Nov. 27, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/sec-
chair-tellsunregistered-icos-to-get-your-act-together-1. 
211 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 207. 
212 Torsten Hartmann, Are security tokens the new standard? What is the difference between 
security vs. utility tokens, CAPTAINALTCOIN (Nov. 11, 2018), 
https://captainaltcoin.com/security-vsutility-tokens/. 
213 Shobhit Seth, 80% of ICOs are Scams: Report, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://www.investopedia.com/news/80-icos-are-scams-report/. 
214 Bonnie Chan, Will airdrop be an alternative to the ICO, GATECOIN (Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://blog.gatecoin.com/will-the-airdrop-be-an-alternative-to-the-ico-1b1bdff716c6. 
215 Id. 
216 Id.  
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to protect investors from ICO scams.217 These trading platforms provide a 
method to buy and sell digital assets, including tokens offered and sold in 
ICOs.218 By targeting platforms and ICOs, the SEC can expand its civil 
enforcement powers.  
On March 7, 2018, the SEC released a “Statement on Potentially 
Unlawful Online Platforms for Trading Digital Assets”, which reiterated 
its position that platforms acting as exchanges and trade tokens that meet 
the definition of a security “must register as a national securities 
exchange or operate under an exemption from registration.”219 Once a 
trading platform is labeled as a “securities exchange”, or otherwise 
operates as an “alternative trading system”,220 the platform comes the 
SEC’s  direct, and is thus subject to the federal securities laws.221  
 On November 8, 2018, the SEC announced that it had settled charges 
against Zachary Coburn, the founder of EtherDelta, a digital trading 
platform.222 This was the first instance of enforcement based on findings 
that the platform operated as an unregistered national securities 
exchange.223 To date, no crypto exchanges have been registered with the 
SEC, though Coinbase is the first platform to apply for registration.224 
F. Broker-Dealer Regulation  
By gaining command over digital asset transactions, the SEC extended 
its registration requirements to investment companies, broker dealers, 
ICOs, and other digital assets.225 Under Section 15 of the Exchange Act, 
any entity that facilitates the issuance of digital security tokens in ICOs 
 
217 Stankovic, supra note 127. 
218 See generally  U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 144. 
219 Id. 
220 Data: Alternative Trading System (“ATS”) List, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (last 
modified Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/atslist.htm (“An ATS is a trading 
system that meets the definition of “exchange” under federal securities laws but is not 
required to register as a national securities exchange if the ATS operates under the 
exemption provided under Exchange Act Rule 3a1-1(a). To operate under this exemption, 
an ATS must comply with the requirements set forth in Rules 300-303 of Regulation 
ATS.”).  
221 Stankovic, supra note 127. 
222 See In re Zachary Coburn, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 84553 (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/34-84553.pdf; see also SEC Charges 
EtherDelta Founder With Operating an Unregistered Exchange, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, Press Release No. 2018-258 (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2018-258. 
223 Id. 
224 Stankovic, supra note 127. 
225 Id. 
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and secondary trading in digital security tokens is required to register with 
the SEC as a “broker” or “dealer.”226  
In In re Tokenlot, LLC, the SEC Commission applied the broker-dealer 
registration requirements to an entity trading or facilitating transactions in 
digital securities for the first time.227  There, an online “ICO superstore” 
offered investors a way to purchase digital tokens during ICOs and engage 
in secondary trading.228 It further demonstrated that entities facilitating 
ICOs and transactions in secondary markets can meet the broker-dealer 
definition even though they do not meet the definition of an exchange.229  
IV. ASSESSING AIRDROPS UNDER THE FEDERAL 
SECURITIES LAWS  
“You can’t just send shares of stock to people. The 
problem with an airdrop is that it’s generally incongruent 
with US security laws. My general advice for STO 
issuers, I would put that airdrop concept on hold. I would 
advise anyone in the US not to do it. I get it, it’s a good 
marketing tactic, but there’s too much risk and 
uncertainty.”230 
There are always people looking for shortcuts, and the use of airdrops 
is no different. In the United States, federal securities laws aim to regulate 
the economy and protect investors by requiring full and fair disclosure 
concerning the offer or sale of securities.231 Complying with these 
complex statutes can be extremely costly and burdensome for issuers, 
which is why digital coin offerings are an increasingly attractive 
“alternative” for raising capital and enticing investors.232 Although they 
are clever attempts to bypass federal securities laws, certain 
cryptocurrencies, ICOs and airdrops may be within their broad scope.233 
And following the determination that an instrument is a security, 
 
226 Id.  
227 SEC Charges ICO Superstore and Owners with Operating As Unregistered Broker - 
Dealers, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Press Release No. 2018-185 (Sept. 11, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-185; see also In re Tokenlot, LLC, Lenny 
Kugel and Eli L. Lewitt, Securities Act Release No. 10453 (Sept. 11, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10543.pdf. 
228 Id. 
229 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 144. 
230 See id. (quoting Darren Marble, CEO of CrowdfundX, a marketing firm for STO). 
231 See generally U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 171. 
232 See Kyriakides, supra note 101. 
233 See Clayton, supra note 1.  
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registration is required unless an exemption is met.234 Additionally, any 
entity or person engaging in exchange activities must register as a national 
securities exchange or operate under an exemption from registration.235 
A. What’s an Airdrop to and Orange Grove? Applying the Howey 
Test 
In reaction to the SEC’s attacks on ICOs, issuers have attempted to 
bypass securities laws through the use of airdrops.236 Determining whether 
a transaction involves digital securities is fact intensive and the outcome 
may differ from case to case.237 Nonetheless, the Howey test has become 
a common legal litmus test for deciding whether or not a digital asset is a 
security. 
Because airdrops involve distributing “free” digital tokens, how can 
the first prong of the Howey test be satisfied if there is no investment of 
money? In fact, “the investment of money” doesn’t necessarily mean 
money.238 The SEC’s DAO Report established that an investment contract 
can be created whether or not the underlying investment consisted of 
money or cash. 239 Instead, “the ‘investment’ may take the form of ‘goods 
and services,’240 or some other ‘exchange of value.’”241 Thus, where an 
issuer provides investors with “free” tokens in exchange for services 
designed to advance their company’s interests, the so-called “free” tokens 
are no longer free.242  
 
234 15 U.S.C. § 77b(e)(c) (2011). 
235 Tang, supra note 123. 
236 Stankovic, supra note 127. 
237 Id. 
238 See Uselton v. Comm. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(explaining that, in determining whether an investment contract exists, cash is not the only 
form of contribution or investment that will create an investment contract). 
239 See Report of Investigation, supra note 122 (This report evidenced the investigation of 
DAO Tokens. DAO is an example of Decentralized Autonomous Organization, which is a 
term used to describe a “virtual” organization embodied in computer code and executed on 
a distributed ledger of blockchain. The investigation of DAO tokens raised question 
regarding the application of the U.S federal securities laws to the offer and sale of DAO 
Tokens, including the threshold question whether DAO Tokens are securities. Based on 
the facts presented in this investigation the Commission determined that DAO tokens are 
securities under the federal securities laws.). 
240 See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979) (an investment may 
take the form of “goods and services” rather than just “cash”). 
241 See Hocking v. Dubois, 885 F.2d 1449, 1471 (9th Cir.1989) (explaining that an 
exchange of value satisfies the first prong of the Howey test).  
242 See In re Tomahawk Exploration LLC and David Thompson Laurance, Securities Act 
Release No. 10530, at 8 (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-
10530.pdf. 
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In the airdrop context, investors trade their services—promoting a 
marketplace—for the issuing company’s virtual token.243 However a 
separate problem occurs in a situation where the tokens are no longer 
defined as conditional gifts  because the issuers do not demand anything 
from the investors. In that scenario, the question is whether the issuers’ 
reliance on the airdrop recipients’ self-interest sufficient to satisfy 
Howey’s first prong? The answer requires viewing a case in its entirety. 
At this point, the SEC’s is that the Howey’s first prong is satisfied when 
airdrop recipients provide marketing or promotional services to the 
issuer.244 
Airdrops can fulfill the “common enterprise” element of Howey’s 
second prong under the horizontal commonality approach. Developers 
pool the recipient’s “investments” together to build the network, i.e., by 
utilizing the investors’ marketing services to promote the underlying 
project. However, the argument against this approach is that the 
“investments” do not lead to capital raising to be used to develop the 
issuer’s project.  
Out of the four prongs, the third prong bears the most weight.245 While 
airdrop recipients do not “purchase” the coins per se, they are incentivized 
to engage in the transactions and promote the tokens to the rest of the 
market in light of the chance to earn a return.246 Thus, by virtue of their 
involvement, the investors are looking to gain some economic benefit from 
these “free” tokens.247 To investors, the tokens are like a golden ticket that 
may enable them to earn a few dollars.248 As long as the “opportunity 
provided to offerees tend[s] to induce [investors] by emphasizing the 
possibility of profits”249 the third Howey prong is met. Thus, the test does 
 
243 David Canellis, SEC Ruling Suggests Cryptocurrency Airdrops violate Securities Law, 
THE NEXT WEB, (Aug. 15, 2018), https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2018/08/15/securities-
sec-airdrops-cryptocurrency/.  
244 Brad R. Jacobsen, Free! Does not mean Freedom from Compliance with U.S. Securities 
Laws – Do ICOs through the Use of AirDrops violate U.S. Securities Laws?, LEXOLOGY 
(Sep. 4, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3bd0e112-3b84-4419-
99e6-df42fcf1a0b1.  
245 Hinman, supra note 37.  
246 COINBASE, supra note 168.  
247 Jacobsen, supra note 246 (“As the SEC views it, a person receiving ‘airdropped’ digital 
tokens provides a service (i.e., pays value) to the company giving away the airdropped 
tokens. The people receiving the tokens are essentially marketers and promoters, spreading 
the popularity of a particular token in the hope that the value will rise.”). 
248 Jay B. Sykes, CONG. RES. SERV., R45301, Securities Regulation and Initial Coin 
Offerings: A Legal Primer, (last updated Aug. 31, 2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45301.pdf. 
249 Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 987 (4th Cir. 1994) (“By profits, the Court has meant 
either capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment . . . or 
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not require that profits actually be attained but may be sufficed merely by 
the opportunity provided to make a profit.  
Lastly, an airdrop must fulfill the fourth prong of the Howey test, 
which looks to whether the profits are derived “solely from the efforts of 
others.”250 Although airdrop investors contribute their services by 
promoting the digital tokens, they ultimately rely on the issuers for the 
success of the underlying tokens. The viability of the business model at 
the outset of the “free” token distribution is unknown, with each recipient 
having no choice but to rely on the promoter to further build the network 
and make the enterprise fruitful.251  To further illustrate, when a recipient 
of an airdropped token merely waits for the token’s value to appreciate and 
does little to market the token themselves, their profits are “from the 
efforts of others.” Furthermore, even if the profits from digital tokens are 
attributed to price speculation, developers significantly influence a token’s 
price on secondary markets through their own actions. Teams of 
developers might release updates online or might tout investors with 
advertising or through social media. 
The endorsers of airdrops might feel differently, finding that airdrop 
recipients do not rely on the efforts of others since they are providing 
marketing services. Accordingly, if the relevant token network is 
sufficiently decentralized, this outcome could change because investors 
may no longer reasonably expect another person or group to carry out the 
managerial efforts. In effect, the tokens distributed would not represent an 
investment contract.252 
B. Registration Requirements under the Securities Act: “For 
Value” 
After assessing whether the subject tokens are securities, the next step 
would be to determine whether an airdrop qualifies as an “offer and sale,” 
which requires registration under section 5 of the Securities Act.253 As 
previously mentioned, an offer is defined as “any attempt to offer or to 
dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy a security or interest in a 
security, for value,” while a sale is defined as “every disposition of a 
security or interest in a security, for value.”254  Even where there is a lack 
 
a participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds. . . In such cases the 
investor is "attracted solely by the prospects of a return" on his investment.”). 
250 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).  
251 Hinman, supra note 37. 
252 Id. 
253 15 U.S.C. § 77b(e)(c) (1933).   
254 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (1933).   
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of monetary consideration exchanged for the securities, there can be an 
offer or sale.255  
Airdrops clearly meet the criteria for an offer but determining whether 
these “free” distributions qualify as sales requires more attention. In the 
case of airdrops, developers attempt to bypass registration requirements 
by “gifting” tokens. However, this tactic is flawed because only bona fide 
gifts do not implicate the registration requirements.256 Thus, a gifted 
security is deemed a sale when the donor receives some real benefit, 
though this benefit does not need to be monetary.257 Upon “gifting” tokens, 
an issuer (donor) of an airdrop receives benefits in the form of online 
marketing and promotional activities by the donee. 
Airdrops are not the first occurrence of “gifting” securities. In the 
landmark case, SEC v. Datronics Engineers, the Fourth Circuit focused on 
whether the donor received value from the gifting of “spin-off” stock.258 
Datronics contended that there was no statutory sale because the transfers 
of stock were not “for value.”259 Contrary to this, the court found that value 
accrued to Datronics because “a market for the stock was created by its 
transfer to so many new assignees,” and “the stock retained by Datronics 
was thereby given an added increment of value.”260 After dissemination, 
the value of the stock appreciated substantially, benefiting Datronics.261 
Thus, the court held that where a “‘gift’ disperses corporate ownership and 
thereby helps to create a public trading market it is treated as a sale.”262 
Similarly, in SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Services, Inc., the Southern District 
Court in Ohio held that the “gifted” shares of stock constituted sales of 
securities since they were intended to create a market.263 In effect, 
permitting these “gifts” would allow companies to evade registration 
requirements and “go public by the backdoor.”264 
 
255 See In re Tomahawk Exploration LLC and David Thompson Laurance, Securities Act 
Release No. 10530, at 7 (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-
10530.pdf. 
256 See Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1949) (transfers were not sales under 
Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act where the parties conceded they were bona fide gifts).   
257 See SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Servs., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 923, 940–43 (S.D. Ohio 
2009), aff’d, 712 F.3d 321 (6th Cir. 2013). 
258 SEC v. Datronics Engineers, Inc., 490 F.2d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 1973). 
259 Id. at 253. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. at 254.  
262 Id. at 253–54. 
263 See SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Servs., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 923, 940–43 (S.D. Ohio 
2009), aff’d, 712 F.3d 321 (6th Cir. 2013). 
264 Glossary of Stock Market Terms: Going Public Through the Backdoor, NASDAQ, 
https://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/g/going-public-through-the-backdoor (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2019) (Defining “going public through the backdoor” as “[t]he process by 
which a company comes to have publicly traded shares without an IPO. This could happen 
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Airdropping tokens presents obvious similarities to the gifting of stock 
shares that took place in these cases. In reality, an issuer is not distributing 
these tokens for a charitable purpose.265 Issuers primarily use airdrops to 
market and distribute their tokens.266 The underlying purpose of these 
“gifts” is to create a public market for the digital project, which provides 
value to the issuer.267 By “gifting” the tokens, the developers hope to create 
a community of users and a public marketplace.268  
Airdrop issuers also receive value through online marketing, including 
the promotion of the project on online forums and blogs.269 Additionally, 
an airdrop may generate some form of economic benefit or value for the 
issuer by generating promotional benefits related to the blockchain 
platform or even by producing more interest in a related token sale.270 
Airdrop issuers are actually “gifting” tokens to recipients in exchange for 
promotional services to advance their own economic objectives and 
generate interest for their projects.271 As a result, issuers rely on these 
“gifts” as a mechanism to disseminate their tokens among users and 
ultimately create a marketplace.272 Essentially, issuers are looking to 
circumvent the registration requirements and the scrutiny that surrounds 
conducting an ICO by creating a public market for their tokens through a 
back-door offering. Despite this clever ruse to evade registration 
requirements these “gifts” unavoidably qualify as sales because they create 
value for issuers.273 
The SEC chose to attack the gift problem under Rule 15c2-11, which 
requires that a broker-dealer have information equivalent to that in a 
registration statement before effecting a transaction.274 This contemporary 
 
through a reverse shell merger, or through acquisition of a public company and offering 
shares to previous owners. Another way is through a series of private placements, selling 
shares on an exchange to institutional and other sophisticated investors.”). 
265 Bitcoin Exchange Guide News Team, Cryptocurrency Airdrops Controversy: 
Philanthropy or Effective Marketing Strategy?, BITCOIN EXCHANGE GUIDE (Nov. 13, 
2018), https://bitcoinexchangeguide.com/cryptocurrency-airdrops-controversy-
philanthropy-or- effective-marketing-strategy/.  
266 Gina Conheady & Christian Munoz, Airdrops: Are free tokens free from regulation?, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (June 1, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/airdrops-
are-free-tokens-free-from-regulation. 
267 Bekiares, supra note 164.  
268 See generally Lee, supra note 65. 




273 SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Servs., Inc., 608 F. Supp.2d 923, 940-943 (S.D. Ohio 2009) 
(“[W]here a gift is followed by widespread downstream sales of those securities, these 
would-be gifts may be characterized as a subterfuge to evade registration.”).  
274 17 CFR § 240.15c2-11 (2015). 
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means of dealing with the “gifted” securities issue and companies going 
public through the back door is intended to ensure that a market-maker has 
adequate information and has completed adequate due diligence before it 
quotes securities.275  
In effect, the SEC has principally used its 1934 Exchange Act powers 
to prevent broker-dealers from making a market for securities for which 
there is no adequate information provided.276 To some degree, the SEC has 
attempted to indirectly engage the airdrop problem by regulating trading 
platforms and broker-dealers. By requiring registration of exchanges and 
broker-dealers, the SEC has tightened its grip on the situation.  
As the evolution of capital formation continues, regulators are guiding 
companies to conduct compliant digital-asset distributions by using 
exemptions available under the existing regulatory framework.277 
C. History Repeats Itself: “Free Stock” Offerings vs. Airdrops 
“Free stock is really a misnomer[.] While cash did not 
change hands, the companies that issued the stock 
received valuable benefits.”278 
Reminiscent of the “Dot.com” bubble burst that occurred roughly two 
decades ago, airdrops share blatant similarities with what was once termed 
“free stock.”279 Internet companies that distributed this so called “free 
stock” were eventually targeted and eradicated by the SEC’s enforcement 
actions.280 As a method of swindling investors into participating in newly 
launched internet ventures, companies offered stock to people who 
provided personal information or agreed to solicit other investors by word 
of mouth.281 In these cases, the SEC was forced to consider whether the 
distribution of free shares of stock triggered the registration requirements 
 
275 See ANTHONY L.G., PLLC, 15c2-11 Application, 
http://www.legalandcompliance.com/securities-law/15c2-11-application/ (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2019). 
276 Id. 
277 Id.  
278 SEC Brings First Actions to Halt Unregistered Online Offerings of So-Called “Free 
Stock”, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (99-83) (last modified Jul. 22, 1999), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/webstock.htm. 
279 See Scott H Kimpel, and Mayme Beth F. Donohue, SEC Brings Enforcement Case 
Involving “Airdrop” of Securities, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP (Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://www.blockchainlegalresource.com/2018/08/sec-brings-enforcement-case-
involving-airdrop-securities/#page=1. 
280 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 280.  
281 Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Settles 4 Cases Offering ‘Free Stock’, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 1999), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/23/business/sec-settles-4-cases-offering-free-
stock.html. 
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of the Securities Act.282 The SEC's analysis focused on whether an offer 
or sale of securities for value took place.283 This empowered the SEC to 
take the position that the issuers were not giving the stocks away for free 
because they were receiving value from the recipients, who acted as 
marketing liaisons by referring the companies to others or engaging in 
some sort of activity to draw the attention of other individuals.284 
Accordingly, there was an offer and sale for value for the purposes of the 
Securities Act.285 Once more, history repeats itself; though this time it is 
airdrop issuers conditioning the market with “free” distributions, thus 
triggering application of the securities laws.  
1. Four Seminal Free Stock Cases 
In four seminal cases the SEC’s enforcement division brought, and 
settled against, distributors of free stock. The common theme was 
unmistakably clear: “free” did not mean free from regulatory 
compliance.286 In each of these cases, prospective recipients were required 
to perform some action—whether that meant signing up on the issuer’s 
website, providing personal information, or email addresses—to receive 
free shares. Additional free shares may also have been offered in exchange 
for referrals. Consequently, issuers received economic benefit from these 
“free stock” offerings. Therefore, there was an offer and sale of securities. 
First, in In re Joe Loofbourrow, the SEC found that Loofbourrow had 
violated the registration provisions of the Securities Act when he 
represented that his company, American Space Corp., would give ten 
shares of “free” stock to individuals who filled out an online registration 
form.287 The online registration form required individuals to provide their 
names, home addresses, and email addresses, and additionally included a 
series of questions aimed at ensuring that registrants had read through 
portions of the website that discussed “financial partner offers.”288 
Loofbourrow also offered additional “free” shares to individuals who 
referred others to his website.289 Based on these actions, the SEC held that 
the primary purpose of the offering was to generate interest and encourage 
 
282 See Conheady & Munoz, supra note 268. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. 
285 Id.  
286 Jacobsen, supra note 246. 
287 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 280; see also In re Joe Loofbourrow, 
Securities Act Release No. 7700 (July 21, 1999), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-
41631.htm.  
288 In re Joe Loofbourrow, Securities Act Release No. 7700 (July 21, 1999), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-41631.htm. 
289 Id. 
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individuals to invest capital in the company, which constituted an offer or 
sale of securities for value.290  
 Second, in In re Web Works Marketing.Com, Inc. and Trace D. 
Cornell, the SEC found dissemination of “free” stock in violation of the 
registration requirements.291  Under Web Works’s scheme, an individual 
would: (1) receive three free shares if they registered with Web Works; (2) 
receive up to ten additional free shares for referrals; (3) receive twenty-
four shares by subscribing to long distance phone services offered by 
Telco; (4) receive 25 extra shares if they remained a Telco customer for 
six months.292 Like in Loofbourrow, Web Works sought to attract visitors 
to its website and generate interest through it’s “free stock offering.”293 
Web Works’s website even went so far as to explain that "high site traffic 
was essential to a successful website . . . When you tell others about the 
site, you create value for the company. That is exactly why we are offering 
the shares as a gift."294 The SEC held that Web Works’s scheme 
constituted an unregistered free stock offering. 
Third, the SEC a made similar finding that unregistered free stock was 
offered online in In re WowAuction.com Inc. and Steven M. Gaddis, Sr., 
where WowAuction offered three shares of “free” stock to individuals who 
registered with the company.295 WowAuction also offered up to seven 
additional free shares for referrals.296 Additionally, five registered users 
were eligible to be selected to receive 10,00 free shares in a drawing.297 
Gaddis and WowAuction disseminated the “free” stock to generate 
interest in WowAuction and attract visitors to the website.298 The SEC held 
 
290 Id. (“The primary purpose of the ‘free’ stock offering was to generate publicity for ASC 
and encourage members of the public to become ‘financial partners" by investing capital 
in ASC.”). 
291 SEC Brings First Actions to Halt Unregistered Online Offerings of So-Called “Free 
Stock”, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (99-83) (Modified Jul. 22, 1999), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/webstock.htm (quoting SEC Enforcement Director 
Richard H. Walker).; see also In re Web Works Marketing.com, Inc. and Trace D. Cornell, 
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295 SEC Brings First Actions to Halt Unregistered Online Offerings of So-Called “Free 
Stock”, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (99-83) (modified Jul. 22, 1999), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/webstock.htm (quoting SEC Enforcement Director 
Richard H. Walker); See also In re Wowauction.com Inc. and Steven Michael Gaddis, 
Securities Act Release No. 7702 (July 21, 1999), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-
7702.htm. 
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that WOWAuction’s scheme qualified as a free stock offering and thus 
violated the registration requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act. 
Fourth, In re Theodore Sotirakis, also involved an offering of 
unregistered “free” stock.299 Here, individuals who registered on the 
website Sotirakis created  for his Kinesis business (“the Kinesis site”) and 
linked a website to the Kinesis site received “free” shares.300 Additionally, 
individuals could also earn extra shares by signaling additional registrants 
to the Kinesis site, like the referral incentive in In re WowAuction.com Inc. 
and Steven M. Gaddis, Sr.301 Once more, the SEC held that free shares 
were distributed to generate site traffic and attract investors, thus 
demonstrating that the shares were disposed of for value.302 
2. “Free” Token Offerings 
The bottom line is that the SEC is not fond of any attempt to offer 
“free” unregistered securities.303 “Free stocks” require recipients to bring 
in additional investors, sign up on the issuers’ websites or link their own 
websites to those of the distributor, hence providing exposure and 
circulation of the stock.304 By creating an interest in their respective 
websites, and a market for their shares, the “free stock” issuers receive 
economic value. Therefore, under the Securities Act, there is an offer or 
sale for value.305  
The SEC’s analysis of the foregoing cases is directly relevant to 
airdrops.306 Airdrops undoubtedly mirror free stock offerings, which, 
while ostensibly “free,” are not intended as  “gift[s] for simple reasons of 
generosity.”307 In view of the “free stock” precedent, an airdrop of tokens 
 
299 SEC Brings First Actions to Halt Unregistered Online Offerings of So-Called “Free 
Stock”, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (99-83) (Modified Jul. 22, 1999), 
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Involving “Airdrop” of Securities, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP: BLOCKCHAIN LEGAL 
RESOURCE (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.blockchainlegalresource.com/2018/08/sec-
brings-enforcement-case-involving-airdrop-securities/#page=1. 
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307Id.; see also In re UniversalScience.com, Inc. and Rene Perez, Securities Act Release 
No. 7879 (Aug. 8, 2000), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-7702.htm (“Thus, a gift 
of stock is a ‘sale’ within the meaning of the Securities Act when the purpose of the ‘gift’ 
350 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:311 
 
without monetary consideration may qualify as an offer or sale when the 
purpose of the airdrop is to advance the network’s economic objectives.308 
This might include establishing a trading market for the tokens, rather than 
making a gift out of generosity.309 In light of the foregoing, airdrops are a 
prime example of history repeating itself.310  
D. Taking down TOM: The SEC’s Unsurprising Crackdown 
It was only a matter of time before the SEC caught up to speed and 
came down on developers using airdrops in place of ICOs. On August 14, 
2018, the SEC issued a cease and desist order against Tomahawk 
Exploration LLC (“Tomahawk”) and David Thompson Laurence for 
violating the registration and antifraud provisions of the federal securities 
acts.311 Following unsuccessful attempts at trying to find private funding, 
Tomahawk and Laurence needed another way to support their oil drilling 
and gas exploration project, which they envisioned taking place in Kern 
County, California.312  
  In the summer of 2017, the Tomahawk ICO website was launched 
, stating the ICO would be open from July through August.313 Through its 
ICO, 200 million Tomahawkcoins (“TOM”) would be issued with the 
hope of raising roughly five million dollars to fund the cost of drilling the 
oil wells.314 Only half of these 200 million coins would be up for purchase 
for potential investors who were willing to gamble the low amount: $0.05 
per token.315 Rather than just offer tokens for purchase, Tomahawk 
 
is to advance the donor's economic objectives rather than to make a gift for simple reasons 
of generosity.”). 
308 DiStefano & Raghuvanshi, supra note 75. 
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310 See generally Dennis M. Wilson, Why Airdrops Are The Next Big Thing in 
Cryptocurrency, MEDIUM (June 26, 2018), 
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Release No. 10530 (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-
10530.pdf; see also SEC Bars Perpetrator of Initial Coin Offering Fraud, U.S. SEC. & 
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introduced a “Bounty Program”316 as a way to further promote the ICO.317 
According to the SEC’s order: 
“Tomahawk dedicated 200,000 TOM to pay to third 
parties in exchange for the third parties’ marketing efforts. 
Tomahawk featured the Bounty Program prominently on 
the ICO Website, offering between 10 and 4,000 TOM for 
activities such as making requests to list TOM on token 
trading platforms, promoting TOM on blogs and other 
online forums like Twitter or Facebook, and creating 
professional picture file designs, YouTube videos or other 
promotional materials.”318  
Ultimately, more than 80,000 TOM tokens were airdropped to 
approximately forty wallet holders with Tomahawk, receiving “value in 
the form of online promotional efforts that targeted potential investors and 
directed them to Tomahawk’s offering.”319 Unfortunately for Tomahawk, 
the profitless ICO and airdropping came with a hefty price tag, including 
fines and a professional sanction against Laurence.320 
To get to its holding, the SEC applied the Howey test.321 Under the 
Howey test, the  SEC found that the TOM tokens were investment 
contracts, and therefore securities.322 Then, under the second part of its 
 
316 See Stefan Stankovic, Are Airdrops Compliant With U.S. Securities Laws?, CRYPTO 
BRIEFING (Aug. 20, 2018), https://cryptobriefing.com/airdrops-compliant-us-securities-
laws/ (“The Bounty Program that the SEC is referring to in this quote is de facto an airdrop 
– which only reiterates the aforementioned point that the SEC may well consider the 
offering of ‘free’ tokens in exchange for services (such as marketing in this case) as a 
securities offering.”). 
317 See In re Tomahawk Exploration LLC and David Thompson Laurance, Securities Act 
Release No. 10530 (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-
10530.pdf; see also SEC Bars Perpetrator of Initial Coin Offering Fraud, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, Press Release No.2018-152 (Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-152. 
318 See id.  
319 See id. 
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(Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2018/08/137933-ico-tokens-the-sec-
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321 See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
322  See In re Tomahawk Exploration LLC and David Thompson Laurance, Securities Act 
Release No. 10530 (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-
10530.pdf (“TOM constituted securities under the federal securities laws during the time 
when Respondents offered and sold them. First, they constituted ‘investment contracts.’ 
An investment contract is an investment of money in a common enterprise with a 
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial 
efforts of others.”); see also SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004); see also SEC v. 
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (“[T]he TOM tokens were offered in exchange 
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analysis, the SEC considered whether the distribution of tokens constituted 
an “offer and sale of securities.”323 The SEC held that “[t]he distribution of 
TOM . . . constituted sales under Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act, 
which applies to ‘every disposition of a security or interest in a security, 
for value.’”324 Notably, the lack of monetary consideration for “free” 
shares did not suggest that there was no sale or offer for purposes of 
Section 5 of the Securities Act.325 Therefore, Tomahawk offered and sold 
TOM tokens without complying with registration requirements or 
qualifying for an exemption from registration, thus violating the federal 
Securities laws.326 
Since Tomahawk and Laurence’s actions were similar to other recent 
SEC orders relating to digital assets,327 it is not shocking that the SEC 
found the TOM tokens to be securities.328 However, the Tomahawk Order 
is noteworthy because it is the first order to address the airdrop 
phenomena.329 It demonstrates the SEC’s view of “free” crypto 
distributions, and also serves as a warning to developers attempting to 
dodge complying with the federal securities laws via airdrops.330   
 
for the investment of money or other contributions of value, including other digital assets. 
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V. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR AIRDROPS? 
Regulators’ heightened scrutiny of ICOs has undoubtedly paved the 
way for the emergence of airdrops. Airdrops have become a tool for 
innovative developers to disguise their securities offerings as “free” token 
giveaways. Yet these distributions have caught the SEC’s eye, which 
continues to maintain a firm stance on its regulation of digital asset 
transactions. The notion of regulation through enforcement stands true as 
the SEC continues to use its enforcement authority to make examples of 
those who fail to comply with the laws, and deter those who might 
otherwise participate in such schemes.331 In Re Tomahawk marks the first 
instance of enforcement over airdrops, demonstrating that even “free” 
tokens are not free from regulatory compliance.332  
The SEC has attempted to clarify its position with regard to digital 
asset transactions through an investigative report, public statements, and a 
slew of lawsuits against emerging tech companies. It is through these 
actions that the SEC has provided its application of the Howey test to 
digital assets. Even without specific reference to airdrops in any of those 
action, it can be concluded that the SEC’s broad jurisdiction encompasses 
airdrop distributions, as evidenced by In re Tomahawk.  
Historically, the SEC’s stop to “free” stock involved preventing 
broker-dealers from making a market in securities for which there is no 
adequate issuer-provided information. To some degree, the SEC has 
followed that strategy with respect to airdrops and cryptocurrencies, by 
regulating trading platforms instead of specifically regulating the token 
offerings. By regulating intermediaries, the SEC seeks to ensure that there 
is no way to circumvent the federal securities laws.  
However, applying this tactic to airdrops and digital assets is trickier 
since their peer-to-peer transactions eliminates the intermediary issue. 
Nonetheless, regulators are encroaching on whatever gray area remains; 
they are quickly closing in on digital asset transactions altogether. We can 
expect to see the SEC continue to expand its oversight of digital assets 
with the goal of creating a marketplace inhabited only by compliant digital 
transactions. But it is also clear that developers will continue to come up 
with new methods for evading securities laws as regulators become 
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stricter. Eliminating one way of distributing virtual securities opens the 
door to another way. 
Are regulators approaching the situation all wrong? Regulators 
continue to walk the tightrope of trying to balance protecting investors, 
avoiding system failures, and fostering innovation. As the crypto market 
continues to develop, regulators must ensure that protection is afforded to 
investors without unduly limiting opportunities for growth. In a sense, 
overly restrictive interpretations of the securities laws might inhibit the 
economy’s growth—punishing not only the bad actors, but the good ones 
as well.  Even though many skeptics are against digital asset 
transactions,333 the underlying technology may prove invaluable for future 
technological innovations. While regulators are required to maintain the 
integrity of the market by weeding out bad actors, they also need to 
balance this interest with the effect of chilling good innovation brought 
about by new technology and good actors.334 If regulators continue on the 
path of heavy-handed regulation, then capital from these digital 
transactions might stop flowing into the U.S., pushing U.S. investors to 
send their money to foreign companies where securities laws are less harsh 
and more certain.335 Market participants may also fear the uncertainty 
surrounding token offerings in the U.S., thus driving token sales overseas. 
SEC enforcement actions have provided some guidance with respect to 
when digital assets are considered securities but have not fully addressed 
the market’s need for comprehensive clarity.  
To achieve further regulatory clarity, Congress should pass legislation 
that establishes a comprehensive legislative and regulatory system 
governing domestic digital assets. Currently, two federal agencies share 
jurisdiction over cryptocurrency regulation: the SEC has jurisdiction over 
“security tokens” and the CFTC has jurisdiction over “commodity 
tokens.” Congress should also vest one agency with regulatory jurisdiction 
over all types of cryptocurrency, especially since determining which 
tokens are commodities and which are securities can be difficult.336 
 
333 David W. Perkins, Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and Selected Policy 
Issues, CONG. RES. SERV. (updated Apr. 9, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45427.pdf 
(“Skeptics doubt that cryptocurrencies can effectively act as money and achieve 
widespread use. They note various obstacles to extensive adoption of cryptocurrencies, 
including economic (e.g., existing trust in traditional systems and volatile cryptocurrency 
value), technological (e.g., scalability), and usability obstacles (e.g., access to equipment 
necessary to participate). In addition, skeptics assert that cryptocurrencies are currently 
overvalued and under-regulated.”). 
334 Examining the Cryptocurrencies and ICO Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
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Otherwise, regulators need to co-coordinate to provide clear guidance to 
the market.   
Furthermore, Congress should authorize the SEC to modify and 
amend its rules to better assist digital asset issuers in meeting the 
requirements of the federal securities laws. The current infrastructure, and 
the federal securities laws, are inadequate to appropriately address digital 
asset transactions.337 While there are already a number of disclosure and 
registration requirements in place, they do not work well with digital asset 
offerings.338 Regulations that needlessly impede on the innovation and 
capital formation opportunities offered by the development of digital 
technologies should be supplemented or modified so that compliance is 
possible.339  
One example of supplementing the existing legal framework is for the 
SEC to promulgate an exemption from the registration requirements 
modeled after Regulation A340 (or as amended by the JOBS Act: 
Regulation A+) or Regulation D under  the Securities Act.341 Currently, 
Regulation A is an exemption from registration for public offerings of up 
to $50 million, providing two tiers of exempt offerings.342 This exemption 
also permits resales and does not require that investors be accredited.343  
 
337 Id. (“[T]he existing rules that apply to the sales of securities and the exemptions from 
registration with the SEC, such as Rule 506 of Regulation D, and Regulation A, though 
helpful, do not fully meet the needs of companies seeking to issue digital assets.”). 
338 Id. (“ICOs present a novel form of capital raising, in which the token investor's primary 
concerns are the likely future commercial viability of the related token platform, and 
(usually) the ability of the Token Company to develop, maintain and operate the token 
platform and the token economy. This is very different from the situation in traditional 
capital raising techniques, such as the sale of stock and bonds, in which investors are 
primarily concerned with the future economic activities and well-being of the company 
that issued the stock or bonds. Not surprisingly, a securities- regulatory scheme developed 
for stocks and bonds does not fit perfectly for tokens and token platforms.”). 
339 Id. (“[R]egulations either need to be created or modified to better suit this type of 
business model, as  registering digital assets as securities is impracticable for these 
companies.”). 
340 17 CFR § 230.251 (2019). 
341 17 CFR § 230.500 (2013). 
342 Raising Capital Using a Regulation A+ Mini IPO, SEEDINVEST (Oct. 28, 2016), 
https://www.seedinvest.com/blog/jobs-act/raising-capital-reg-a-mini-ipo (explaining that 
Tier 1 offerings are up to $20 million and Tier 2 offerings are up to $50 million, with 
investors of Tier 2 subject to investment limits of the greater of 10% of their net worth or 
10% of their net income). 
343 Id.; see also James Chen, Accredited Investor, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated Feb. 23, 
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/accreditedinvestor.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 
2019) (“An accredited investor is a person or a business entity who is allowed to deal in 
securities that may not be registered with financial authorities. They are entitled to such 
privileged access if they satisfy one (or more) requirements regarding income, net worth, 
asset size, governance status or professional experience. In the U.S., the term is used by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under Regulation D to refer to investors 
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Regulation D also has two “tiers”, Rule 506(b), and Rule 506(c), with 
no cap on the amount of the offering.344 Rule 506(b) allows for an 
unlimited number of accredited investors, and thirty-five non-accredited 
investors, but does not allow for general solicitation or advertising.345 On 
the other hand, Rule 506(c) requires that all investors be accredited and 
their status verified by the issuer, but allows for general solicitation.346 
A hybrid of Regulations A and D might offer an exemption suitable 
for digital token issuers. This exemption may retain some features of both 
Regulations A and D, or modify them. For example, the proposed 
exemption could have no resale restrictions, an offering cap of $100 
million, only allow for accredited investors, and permit general 
solicitation.  Furthermore, the disclosure requirements would need to be 
particular to token offerings and might require the white paper to include 
the prospectus (or vice versa). Moreover, the prospectus would need to be 
available on the online platform. Information about the platform’s 
supporting network might also need to be included as per the disclosure 
requirements. And airdrops could be allowed so long as they are outlined 
within the prospectus.  
For token exchanges, Congress or the SEC could propose a safe harbor 
rule allowing for the trade of security tokens if the issuer has either 
registered with the SEC or qualifies for an exemption from registration.  
While the federal securities laws have served our capital markets well 
since their adoption in the 1930s, it is time for Congress and the SEC to 
address technological innovations and amend the outdated rules. Without 
clearer guidelines regarding the regulation of digital securities, the growth 
of the nation’s capital markets will be hindered.       
CONCLUSION 
In the twenty-first century, cryptocurrency has emerged as a new 
wonder of the world. Building off blockchain technology, new digital 
platforms have consumed the virtual marketplace, disrupting it and 
fashioning innovative branding strategies. For issuers seeking a way 
around compliance and the scrutiny following ICOs, airdrops seem like 
the next best option. But based on past enforcement actions halting “free 
stock” offerings and gifted securities, the current regulatory regime 
 
who are financially sophisticated and have a reduced need for the protection provided by 
regulatory disclosure filings. Accredited investors include natural high net worth 
individuals (HNWI), banks, insurance companies, brokers and trusts.”). 
344 See generally Fast Answers: Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (last 
modified Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-rule506htm.html. 
345 Id. 
346 Id. 
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surrounding ICOs and the SEC’s framework for analyzing digital asset 
transactions, airdrops cannot avoid the SECs broadly casted jurisdiction. 













    
 
 
 
 
